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levels and, consequently, how they are likely to affect the expected skill composition 
of migration. Using survey data from Mexico, we then show that the probability of 
migration is increasing with education in communities with low migrant networks, 
but decreasing with education in communities with high migrant networks. This is 
consistent with positive self-selection of migrants being driven by high migration 
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of migrants being driven by lower returns to education in the U.S. than in Mexico, as 
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1. Introduction 
The skill level of Mexicans migrating to the United States is an issue of important 
policy relevance on both sides of the border. In the U.S. an important element of 
opposition to immigration centers on the extent to which low-skilled Mexicans 
depress the wages of low-skilled natives. The effects of emigration on Mexico’s 
development will vary according to whether those who leave are less skilled than 
those who remain, helping to reduce poverty and inequality, or more skilled, 
heightening already high inequality levels.  
However, a series of recent papers have produced conflicting results as to whether 
Mexican migrants are positively or negatively selected in terms of educational skills. 
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) find migration rates to be increasing in education up to 
relatively high education levels, that is, positive selection. Cuecuecha (2005b) and 
Mishra (2007) also find positive selection. These findings have been challenged by 
Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2006) and Fernández-Huertas (2006), who conclude that 
there is negative selection, with migrants tending to be less educated than non-
migrants. Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) find intermediate selection, with migrants 
more likely to be in the middle of the skill distribution than in the low or high end, 
compared to non-migrants. In contrast, Caponi (2006) finds a U-shaped relationship, 
with the highest and lowest educated tending to migrate more than the middle 
educated. 
The contribution of this paper is to show that migration networks can in part reconcile 
some of these conflicting findings, with positive self-selection occurring in 
communities with low migration networks and negative self-selection occurring in 
communities with high migration networks. Different data sets of communities will 
thus yield different answers as to the average direction of selection.   3
Self-selection is driven primarily by wage differentials net of migration costs 
(Sjaastad, 1962). Thus, in theory various self-selection patterns with respect to 
education and skills may be observed depending on whether the wage-skill profile is 
steeper at origin or destination and on whether migration costs increase or decrease 
with skills. Borjas (1987) concentrates on the wage side, and famously argues that 
individuals migrating from countries with high earnings inequality to countries with 
low earnings inequality will tend to be negatively self-selected. Income inequality is 
substantially higher in Mexico than in the United States. The Gini index of income in 
2000 was 0.41 in the U.S. and 0.55 in Mexico, while in the same year the income 
share of the highest 10 percent was 43 percent in Mexico, compared to 30 percent in 
the U.S. (World Bank, 2004). All else equal, one would therefore predict negative 
self-selection among Mexican emigrants. 
This prediction assumes that all migration costs are proportional to wages at home 
and therefore do not determine self-selection patterns. However, in practice 
international migration is costly, involving upfront monetary costs, search and 
information costs, and psychological costs. Such costs are unlikely to be constant 
across education levels, but instead be decreasing in skills (Chiquiar and Hanson, 
2005; Cuecuecha, 2005a). For example, fixed costs of migration represent fewer 
hours of work and can be met with no or lower borrowing costs by more educated 
individuals, and education can help in seeking information. As Chiswick (1999, p. 
182) puts it, the more able are also more efficient in migration. If migration costs are 
large enough, and credit constraints sufficiently binding, one should therefore expect 
to see positive selection in terms of education as individuals with low education find it 
too costly to move.   4
Given this, the pattern of self-selection should depend on how costly migration is 
from a given community. Migration networks act to lower the costs of migrating in a 
number of ways: they provide information on job opportunities and labor market 
conditions at destination, information on border crossing, including on ways to find 
and deal with smugglers, assistance in job search and housing, and help relaxing 
credit constraints (Massey, 1988; Orrenius, 1999, Orrenious and Zavodny, 2005, 
Dolfin and Genicot, 2006). These effects are likely to benefit low-skill migrants the 
most. In part this is due to them being more likely to be credit-constrained, but may be 
due also to the fact that ethnic enclaves provide services mainly to migrants with low 
skills in general and low levels of host-language fluency in particular (Borjas, 1999, 
Chiswick and Miller, 2005, Bauer et al., 2005).
1 As a result we should expect to see a 
greater degree of negative self-selection in communities with larger migration 
networks. 
This paper therefore examines the role of migration networks in shaping the self-
selection pattern of Mexico-U.S. migration. We begin by augmenting the simple 
theoretical model in Chiquiar-Hanson (2005) to allow for network effects, and use 
this to determine the impact of increasing network size on selectivity. Using survey 
data from Mexico we then show that in communities with small migration networks, 
education increases the probability of migration, giving rise to positive self-selection 
among migrants. However, for communities with large migration networks, education 
is shown instead to decrease migration propensities, giving rise to negative self-
selection, as conjectured by Borjas (1987). We use historic migration networks to 
instrument for current networks in this analysis. The results are found to be robust to 
                                                  
1 Indeed, Bauer et al. (2005) show that enclaves selectively attract people with limited language skills 
while all else equal migrants with better host-country language proficiency choose destinations with 
smaller home-country networks.   5
attempts to account for the undercounting of migrants who move with their entire 
households to the United States, and to allowing education to be itself affected by the 
prospect of migration.  
These findings further demonstrate the pivotal role played by migration networks in 
determining the pattern of migration, and go part of the way towards reconciling the 
conflicting evidence on migrant selectivity arising from the recent literature.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out a model of self-
selection which includes migration networks. Section 3 describes our identification 
strategy and empirical methodology, while Section 4 discusses the data used. Section 
5 provides the main results and Section 6 robustness to undercounting and 
endogenous education formation. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The model 
2.1 Wage Equations 
Starting with Sjaastad (1962), migration has been modeled as an investment decision 
where prospective migrants make their decision based on the net discounted value of 
income streams across locations. Given that migration incentives and costs vary 
according to age, gender, education, and other individual characteristics, immigrants 
self-select out of the general population non-randomly. Following Borjas (1987), a 
series of recent papers have adapted Roy's (1951) model of self-selection to the issue 
of Mexican immigration to the U.S. (e.g., Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005, Orrenious and 
Zavodny, 2005, Ibarraran and Lubotsky, 2005). We extend these models to allow for 
network effects. Using the notation of Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), the wage equation 
in Mexico (subscript 0) may be written as: 
s w 0 0 0 ln δ μ + =           ( 1 )    6
where  w is the wage,  0 > μ  is the minimal wage level paid in the absence of 
schooling,  0 > δ  is the return to schooling and s is the level of schooling. 
 
Similarly, the wage equation in the U.S. (subscript 1) may be written as: 
s w 1 1 1 ln δ μ + =           ( 2 )  
As minimum wages are higher in the U.S. and relative returns to schooling are higher 
in Mexico, we assume  0 1 μ μ >  and  1 0 δ δ > .
2 
 
2.2 Migration Costs  
Let C be the migration cost. In line with the migration networks literature (Massey et. 
al., 1987, Carrington et al., 1996, Bauer et al., 2002, Munshi, 2003, Kanbur and 
Rapoport, 2005), we assume that it is decreasing with the size of the community 
migration network, n: 
0 C'   ), ( < = n C C           ( 3 )  
Expressed in time-equivalent units, the migration cost






s n = = π π           ( 4 )  
 
Then, a resident of Mexico will find it beneficial to migrate to the U.S. if
4 
                                                  
2 Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2005) and Cuecuecha (2005) all provide 
evidence supporting these assumptions. 
3 To explain why people with similar networks and schooling levels may make different migration 
decisions, we could add a source of unobserved heterogeneity such as preferences for consuming in 
one's origin country. This may be captured for example by adding a psychological component to the 
migration cost in the form of an individual taste parameter ki distributed on [0,1] with density g(k) such 
that C=C(n,k), C'<0 and 
k n s e
3 2 1 γ γ γ μπ π
− − − = , with s and k independently distributed. Note also that k 
could be seen as positively depending on n as having landsleit (people from the same town or village) 
certainly makes it not only cheaper to move, but also easier to adapt to the new destination, thus 
reinforcing the role of networks. However, this would not change the qualitative predictions of our 
results (which may be seen as valid "for a given k" and easily generalize to all k) and we therefore keep 
this additional component implicit.   7
0 ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 0 1 0 1 > − − ≅ + − π w w C w w      (5) 
 
We assume that time-equivalent migration costs decrease with schooling. This occurs 
as a result of higher wages requiring less hours of work to pay a given fixed fee, and 
is also consistent with recent evidence provided by Cuecuecha (2005a), who describes 
a number of other channels leading to this decreasing relationship, including the better 
ability of more educated individuals to bargain with smugglers. In addition, migration 
costs and therefore time-equivalent migration costs decrease with the size of the 
community migration network, n: 
n s 2 1 ) ln( γ γ μ π π − − =         ( 6 )  
so that 
n s e
2 1 γ γ μπ π
− − = with  0 , 2 1 > γ γ . 
 
Assume first an initial migration network of a given size, which we normalize to zero 
without loss of generality. Prospective migrants face a wage profile by schooling level 
at destination which is given by  
s e s A
1
1 1
γ μπ δ μ
− − + =  (see the solid line in Figure 1). 
In order not to rule out the possibility of positive self-selection, we also assume, 
following Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), that 
π μ μ μ e < − 0 1 . That is, the inter-country 
minimum wage differential is not high enough to warrant migration for people with 
very high migration costs (i.e., people with no schooling and no migration network to 
rely on). For a given size of the migration network, one can then distinguish two 
schooling thresholds between which people will want to migrate:  L s , below which 
migration costs are so high that they make migration not profitable, and  U s , above 
which returns to schooling in Mexico are high enough to discourage migration. 
                                                                                                                                             
4 The approximation is valid if π is small, which appears the case if w is defined as the present value of 
a flow of future incomes.   8
Chiquiar and Hanson then discuss the pattern of self-selection in U.S.-Mexico 
migration by reference to these two thresholds. Assume that the support of s is [] s s, . 
Now, if  U L s s s s < < < , then positive self-selection obtains. Conversely, if 
s s s s U L < < < , then negative self-selection obtains. For any other ranking we need 




2.3 The effect of a larger migrant network 
The effect of expanding (or introducing) migration networks is to decrease migration 
costs at all schooling levels. Diagrammatically, this means an upward shift of the 
wage-schooling profile at destination following introduction or expansion of 
migration networks. In addition, schooling and networks are substitutes in lowering 
the cost of migration. The new wage profile at destination is now given by 
n s e s B
2 1
1 1
γ γ μπ δ μ
− − − + ≡  (see the dashed line in Figure 1), with the two profiles A and 
B converging at high levels of schooling as the reduction in migration costs is 
strongest at low schooling levels. This can be stated formally as: 
 
Proposition 1: Larger migrant networks increase migration incentives (i) at all 
schooling levels, and (ii) more so at low schooling levels. 
 
                                                  
5 For example, positive self-selection obtains if  L s s <  and  U s s >  but the distribution of s is such 
that the density is highest between s  and  L s .   9
Proof: The induced change in migration incentives, which we denote by Δ, is given 




1 2 1 1 > ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − = − = Δ
− − − −
n




γ μ γ γ μ γ μ π π π , with  
0 / > ∂ Δ ∂ n  and  0 / < ∂ Δ ∂ s . 
 
Following the expansion of networks, a change in migration incentives (i.e., in wages 
at destination net of migration costs) defines two new threshold values of s, 
'
L s  and 
'
U s , with  L L s s <
'  and  U U s s >
' . As migration networks expand, more people are 
willing to migrate at both ends of the migrants' schooling distribution. How will this 
translate in terms of self-selection patterns? In all likelihood, larger networks will 
reinforce, or increase the chances of obtaining, negative self-selection. 
 
To show why this is the case, consider first the two configurations for which it is 
obvious that there is either positive or negative self-selection, independently of the 
exact schooling distribution; that is, in the case where  U L s s s s < < <  (positive self-
selection) or  s s s s U L < < <  (negative self-selection). In the first event, all additional 
migrants have schooling levels below  L s  and it is therefore clear that the average 
level of schooling among migrants decreases. Positive self-selection still obtains as by 
construction non-migrants are at the lower end of the schooling distribution, but in a 
less pronounced way. In the second event, the effect of networks is to increase 
average schooling levels both among migrants and non-migrants, but more so among 
the later so that negative self-selection still prevails but in a more pronounced way. 
 
Consider then the more general case where there is intermediate self-selection of 
migrants; assuming that there will always be non-migrants at the two ends of the   10
schooling distribution (i.e., the support of s is [ ] s , 0  and  0
' > L s ,  s sU <
' ), are we sure 
that migration networks reinforce, or increase the chances of obtaining, negative self-
selection? In this configuration, we know that networks will act to increase the 
number of migrants and that the additional migrants will come from the two intervals 
( )
'
L L s s −  and ( )
'
U U s s − . The impact in terms of migrants' skills relatively to non-
migrants will depend on which of these two intervals is longer and on the density of 
the schooling distribution on the two intervals. In the following, we focus on the 
length of the two segments and rule out the possibility that the density of the 
schooling distribution is higher on ( )
'
U U s s −  than on ( )
'
L L s s − , which is quite realistic 
(and increasingly so for larger and larger networks). Hence, our results hold true for 
any distribution for which the density is not increasing in schooling (including, 
obviously, the uniform distribution) and for other distributions as well providing that 
the above restriction holds. 
 
In particular, under this configuration, we have: 
 
Proposition 2: With intermediate self-selection, where the support of s is [] s , 0  and 
0
' > L s,  s sU <
' , 
(a) An increase in the migration network increases the range of lower schooling 
levels that wants to migrate more than it increases the range of higher schooling 
levels that wants to migrate. i.e.  ' ' U U L L s s s s − > −  . 
(b) Providing that the density of the schooling distribution is not increasing in 
schooling, larger migration networks reduce average levels of schooling among   11
migrants (and increase average levels of schooling among non-migrants), therefore 
increasing the likelihood and/or degree of migrants' negative self-selection. 
 
Proof: see appendix. 
 
3. Data  
The main source of data is the 1997 Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica 
(ENADID) (National Survey of Demographic Dynamics) conducted by Mexico’s 
national statistical agency (INEGI) in the last quarter of 1997.
6 The ENADID is a 
large nationally representative demographic survey, with approximately 2000 
households surveyed in each state, resulting in a total sample of 73,412 households.  
3.1 Which migrants to look at? 
The survey asks whether household members have ever been to the U.S. in search of 
work. This information is collected for all individuals who normally live in the 
household, even if they are temporarily studying or working elsewhere, and includes 
information on the number of times an individual has been abroad, and the date of the 
last visit. Secondly, additional questions are asked about migration during the last five 
years, with detailed questions collected on the last trip. Finally, the survey also asks 
whether there are any individuals who were living in the household five years ago 
who have moved abroad, regardless of whether or not they are currently considered 
part of the household. 
With this information we can examine whether a 15 to 49 year old individual 
migrated for the first time during the period 1996-97. This restriction is made for 
several reasons. Firstly, the role of networks is believed to be less important for 
                                                  
6 Survey methodology, summary tables, and questionnaires are contained in INEGI (1999).   12
individuals making a repeat migration trip (Massey, Goldring and Durand, 1994), and 
therefore we wish to model the initial migration decision. However, since we only 
know the number of trips an individual has made, and the date of last migration, we 
can only model the initial migration decision for individuals making their first trip in 
the recent past.
7 Secondly, by comparing migration from different communities in a 
single two-year period, we are much less concerned about the interaction between 
community networks and macroeconomic shocks. Thirdly, this short period makes 
recall bias which varies with education much less of a concern than looking at 
migration over a lifetime.  
As with other Mexico-based surveys of migration
8, the ENADID will only capture 
data on migrants who have either returned to Mexico, or who have at least one 
household member remaining in Mexico. As a result it will tend to underrepresent 
permanent migrants (Hanson, 2006) who are likely to take their whole household. In 
Table 1, we use the 5% public use sample of the 2000 U.S. Census (Ruggles et al., 
2004) to examine the marital status of 18-45 year old Mexican migrants who arrived 
in the U.S. within two years of the Census. We see that 14.4 percent of male migrants 
are married, with their spouse present. These individuals are likely not to be reported 
on in Mexico-based surveys. However, the majority of migrants are either single, or 
married with a spouse remaining in Mexico, and so should be reported on from 
                                                  
7 In particular, an individual is defined to be a first-time migrant if they migrated during 1996 or 1997, 
and have only made one trip to the United States. 
8 The two other main Mexican surveys used to look at migrant selection are the Mexican Migration 
Project (MMP) and the Mexican Census. Neither of these is suitable for our study. The MMP does 
contain information on the age of first migration, but is not nationally representative, and in particular, 
samples only a small number of communities with small migration networks (see Figure 2 in 
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2006a). Since most communities have reasonably large networks, this makes 
it difficult to see how migration varies with network size starting from a low level. The Mexican 
Census only collects data on whether an individual has migrated within the last five years, preventing 
its use for looking at the determinants of first-time migration.   13
Mexico. The problem is much worse with females, with 48 percent of all recent 
migrants in the U.S. being married with spouse present.  
There are two main concerns with this undercount for our analysis. The first is that the 
U.S. census provides no information on the community of origin, and so no network 
variables are known for the unmeasured individuals. The second concern is that the 
education levels of migrants who are not reported on in the ENADID may differ from 
the education levels of migrants who are reported on. There is strong evidence to 
suggest that this is the case. For example, 16.0 percent of the male migrants in Table 1 
who have a spouse present in the U.S. have post-high school education, compared to 
only 8.3 percent of those in the other marital categories. Ibarraran and Lubotsky 
(2006) compare the U.S. and Mexican censuses and likewise conclude that migrants 
that are excluded in the Mexican census are likely to be more educated.  
Given these concerns, we do not look at self-selection among female migrants – with 
only half of all female migrants likely to be reported on in the ENADID, we consider 
the likely bias from doing so to be too severe. Additionally, since female migration is 
so closely tied to the migration of the spouse, the theory above is less directly 
applicable for females. For males the ENADID is likely to measure 86 percent of 
migrants, and we will carry out robustness exercises to see how sensitive our results 
are to those who are undercounted. 
3.2 Measuring the Community Network 
We follow Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994) in measuring the community 
migration network by the proportion of all individuals aged 15 and over in a given 
community who have ever migrated. We restrict our analysis to municipalities in 
which at least 50 households were interviewed in the survey in order to measure the   14
community migration network. This results in data on 55,848 males aged 15-49 in 
288 communities for our analysis. Sample statistics are shown in Table 2. Since the 
role of networks is likely to be greater outside of large cities, we will carry out the 
majority of our analysis for individuals living in locations of less than 100,000 
population. This reduces the sample to 25,531 individuals in 254 communities. 
Table 2 also summarizes the main variables of interest separately for the group of 
migrants. On average male migrants aged 15-49 have less schooling than the average 
male of this age, and are more likely to be married and the head of a household. We 
now discuss our identification strategy and econometric methodology before 
examining how schooling interacts with migration networks in shaping the migration 
decision. 
4. Methodology and Identification Strategy 
4.1 Identification 
Our empirical work will examine how the degree of educational selectivity in 
migration varies with the size of a community’s migrant network. However, this 
raises the concern that there are unobserved community characteristics which drove 
migration in the past, continue to drive migration today, and which could also be 
correlated with education levels in the community. For example, a community with 
poor schooling infrastructure may have low levels of education and a lot of 
individuals migrating to seek better lives for their children. This would lead us to 
spuriously find that negative selection on education occurs more in high migration 
communities. However, if the first migrants from a community are positively selected, 
as would be the case if education is needed to learn about opportunities abroad or to 
adapt to a new land without a network around, we might expect large networks to   15
arise in places with better education, biasing us towards finding positive selection on 
education occurs more in high education communities. This view is consistent with 
Feliciano (2001), who finds that in 1910, Mexican immigrants were more likely to be 
literate than the general Mexican population.  
To account for this concern we follow Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) and a number of 
subsequent studies in using historic state-level migration rates as an instrument for 
current migration networks.
9 In particular, we use the U.S. migration rate from 1924 
for the state in which the migrant household is located, taken from Foerster (1925). 
Likewise, we will use the interaction between education and historic migration 
networks as an instrument for the interaction between education and community 
migration prevalence. The main argument used to justify the use of this instrument is 
that these historic migration rates were the result of the pattern of the arrival of the 
railroad system in Mexico, coupled with changes in U.S. demand conditions for 
agricultural labor. As migration networks lower the cost of migration for future 
migrants, they then become self-perpetuating.
10 
These instruments are strong predictors of current migration prevalence and its 
interaction with education. Appendix table A1 shows first-stage F-statistics between 
40.5 and 54.1. To justify the exclusion restriction, we need to argue that these historic 
rates affect current migration decisions only through current migration networks. A 
potential threat to this instrument is that communities which responded more to the 
expansion of the railroad may have been ones with historically poor schooling 
infrastructure and inequality, or that the development of the railroads ushered in the 
                                                  
9 Hanson and Woodruff (2003); McKenzie and Rapoport (2006a, 2006b); López-Córdoba (2005); and 
Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005) all employ historic migration rates as instruments for current 
migration.  
10 Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2006a) provide more detailed 
discussion of the historic processes involved .   16
expansion of infrastructure such as schooling facilities. This could affect current 
education through the intergenerational transmission of schooling, and through the 
inertia in schooling infrastructure. To allow for this possibility, we control for a 
number of historic variables that capture schooling access, achievement, and equality, 
and for historic measures of inequality. Even after controlling for these variables, the 
historic migration rates remain strong predictors of current community migration 
prevalence. 
4.2 Estimation 
To test our predictions on the role of networks in determining the pattern of self-
selection into migration, we estimate the following equation for whether a 15-49 year 
old male i in community c migrates for the first time in the period 1996-97, 
conditional on never having previously migrated: 
c i c c i
c t i c c i c i
Z X









β β β β β
+ + +
× + + + + =
 (7) 
where Mi,c is an indicator variable taking the value one if individual i migrates and 
zero if they do not migrate, educi,c is the completed years of schooling of individual i, 
networkc is the community migration prevalence in community c (our measure of the 
network), and Xi,c and Zc are control variables capturing individual and community 
characteristics respectively.  
Although Mi,c is a binary variable, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) for estimation. The main reason for this choice is that our 
primary coefficient of interest is β4, which shows how the impact of education on the 
likelihood of migration varies according to the size of the network. Our prior is that 
migration networks lower the costs of migrating more for the less-educated, so that β4   17
should be negative. Interpretation of this coefficient is clear in the linear model, 
whereas in logit and probit models, the marginal effect of the interaction term differs 
from, and can even be of opposite sign to, the interaction term (Ai and Norton, 2003). 
Justification for using 2SLS with binary outcomes can be found in Angrist (1991), 
who provides conditions under which linear instrumental variables estimation will 
consistently estimate average treatment effects, and Monte Carlo evidence to argue 
that these conditions may hold approximately, so that 2SLS can perform well in 
practice. 
5. Results 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (7). Columns 1 through 4 present 
OLS estimates, and 5 through 9 present 2SLS estimates. The first column shows the 
OLS results for all population areas combined. The second column then interacts 
population size with the migration network. As we would expect, the effect of the 
community network is less in large cities. We therefore consider only individuals in 
areas with less than 100,000 population in column 3, and for robustness, show results 
for less than 15,000 population in column 4. Across all population sizes the OLS 
results show a significant positive coefficient on the linear term in education, and a 
significant negative coefficient on the quadratic term. Migration is more likely for 
individuals who are married, household heads, and in communities with larger 
networks. The interaction between education and network size is negative, as theory 
predicts, and significant at the 5% level in communities with less than 100,000 
population. These results continue to hold after instrumenting for community 
migration networks in columns 5 through 7, with some changes in the magnitudes of 
the coefficient. The first-stage F-statistics are all above 30, see Appendix table A1 for 
the full first-stage results for column 6.   18
Columns 8 and 9 examine the robustness of our key parameter of interest, the 
interaction between education and community networks, to the inclusion of 
municipality fixed effects. Including municipality fixed effects will control for any 
differences across communities which might affect the level of migration, such as 
differences in infrastructure and attitudes towards education and migration. We see 
that the interaction coefficients remain significant and negative, with minor changes 
in the size of the coefficient.  For example, for communities under 100,000, the 
interaction changes from -0.55 in column 6 to -0.43 in column 9, whereas for all 
communities the interaction only changes from -0.46 to -0.47. 
Comparing the OLS and 2SLS results, we see that the interaction between education 
and the migrant network becomes more negative after instrumentation. This suggests 
that communities with higher migration have unobservable factors such as better 
schooling infrastructure or an education culture that leads, ceteris paribus, to higher 
education. This accords with the evidence in Feliciano (2001), who found migrants in 
1910 (a time when migrant networks were first forming) to have higher literacy rates 
than non-migrants. 
Interpreting the fitted relationship between education, network size and the 
probability of migration is most easily done graphically. For illustration purposes, and 
because networks are found to be more powerful outside of large cities, we show this 
for the regressions which consider individuals in areas of less than 100,000 
population. Figure 2 plots the predicted probability of migration from OLS (left 
panel) and 2SLS (right panel) at different percentiles of the community migration 
prevalence distribution. Recall from Table 1 that mean years of schooling is 7.3, and 
the median is 7. Both the OLS and 2SLS results show clearly that migrants becomes   19
progressively more negatively selected in terms of education as network size grows, 
with this result stronger after instrumenting for migration networks.  
The 2SLS results in Figure 2 show that in communities with small migration 
networks, where the costs of migrating are thus likely to be high, the probability of 
migration is increasing in completed years of schooling up to nine or ten years of 
schooling, around the 75
th percentile of the education distribution. That is, first-time 
male migrants from communities with small networks are likely to be positively 
selected. However, as the migrant network grows, lowering the costs of migration and 
reducing credit constraints, we find a reversal in this pattern. An individual in a 
community at the 70
th percentile of migration networks, where 25 percent of 
households in the community have someone who has ever migrated to the U.S., has 
the highest probability of migrating if he has two to five years of schooling.  
Thus we find that in communities with low migration networks, migrants tend to be 
selected from the upper-middle of the education distribution, which concurs with 
Chiquiar and Hanson’s (2005) description of selectivity. However, in high network 
communities, where the cost of migrating is less binding, we find negative selection, 
which is what would be predicted by Borjas (1987) based on wage differentials. As a 
result, over time, as origin communities accumulate migration experience, one should 
expect to see a gradual worsening in the relative skill level of migrants. This finding is 
consistent with more aggregate evidence provided by Feliciano (2001), who finds a 
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6. Robustness 
6.1 Robustness to Undercounting of Migrants 
As discussed in Section 3, one concern with the ENADID and other Mexico-based 
migration surveys is that they do not capture migrants who move with their whole 
families, who are more educated on average than those who have family members 
remaining. The omission of such individuals is thus likely to bias against finding 
positive selection, since some highly educated migrants are not included in the 
regressions. 
To investigate the robustness of our results to this issue, we use the public use sample 
of the U.S. Census to obtain the educational breakdown of the 14.4% of recent male 
migrants who have migrated with their spouse present, and are hence least likely to be 
reported on from Mexico.
11 Our sample of 55,848 males in the ENADID contains 568 
recent first-time migrants. Based on an undercount of 14.4%, there should be an 
additional 95 migrants in the analysis. We therefore assign the education distribution 
observed in the U.S. Census to these 95 additional migrants, and then reweight the 
ENADID migrant sample so that it reflects the educational breakdown of the 
combined 663 migrants. For example, 17 of the ENADID sample have 16 or 17 years 
of education, and we estimate from the U.S. Census that 7 out of the additional 95 
migrants would also have this education level. Migrants in the ENADID with 16 or 17 
years education are therefore assigned a weight of 24/17 = 1.41. 
                                                  
11 The U.S. Census does not provide information on whether these individuals are coming from high or 
low migration networks. Our weighting procedure implicitly assumes the unobserved individuals are 
drawn from communities in the same proportions as observed individuals. Given the relatively low 
level of undercount for males, and the fact that our fitted probabilities don’t change by much, we 
believe the general pattern of our results is also robust to alternative assumptions about the network 
these undercounted individuals are drawn from.    21
Table 4 then provides the estimated 2SLS results after adjusting for undercount. 
Columns 1 and 2 replicate columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 for ease of comparison. 
Columns 3 and 4 then provide the undercount-adjusted coefficients. We see that our 
main coefficient of interest, the interaction between education and network size, 
becomes slightly more negative, and is still significant. Figure 3 plots the predicted 
probabilities from column 4, and compares them to the predicted probabilities for the 
unadjusted results in column 2. The results show that adjusting for undercounting 
leads to only small changes in the fitted curves. The adjusted curves are all above the 
unadjusted curve, reflecting that the likelihood of migration at any given education 
level is higher than estimated with just the ENADID data, since some migrants aren’t 
recorded. Secondly, we see that the effect of the larger interaction term is to shift the 
curves rightward slightly, resulting in more positive selection or less negative 
selection for a given community network. However, we still find positive selection at 
low levels of community migration prevalence, and negative selection at high levels, 
showing our results are robust to undercounting of some migrants. 
6.2 Robustness to Endogenous Education Formation 
In keeping with the literature on migrant selection, we have thus far treated education 
as exogenous when modeling selectivity into migration. However, there are number 
of reasons to believe that migration prospects can in turn affect education levels 
acquired. Most first-time migrants from Mexico travel to the U.S. without 
documentation, including 91% of first-time migrants in the ENADID sample. 
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) argue that there is no return on schooling in the 
first job for unauthorized workers, and using a sample of individuals becoming 
legalized during an amnesty program, find that finishing high school or having post-
high school education only pays off in terms of wages about four years after   22
legalization. As a result, as demonstrated by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), the return 
to schooling is higher in Mexico than it is for Mexican migrants in the United States. 
As a result, the prospect of future education may actually lower the incentive to invest 
in education. 
This effect is likely to be largest for individuals with a migrant parent, who are 
themselves then much more likely to migrate. Moreover, although the migrant parent 
can provide remittances which can ease in credit constraints restricting schooling, the 
absence of a parent can also have a detrimental effect on schooling. McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2006b) estimate that the net effect of having a migrant parent is to lower 
the level of schooling attained by 16 to 18 year old males. Using 2SLS they estimate 
the size of the effect to be a 1.3 year reduction in years of schooling attained. They 
also carry out estimation using a censored ordered probit (COP), which accounts for 
the fact that some 16 to 18 year olds are still completing their education and so have 
censored schooling levels, and for the fact that distribution of years of schooling tends 
to clump at 6, 9 and 12 years, representing finishing different levels of schooling. This 
results in estimates of the extent to which having a migrant parent changes the 
probability of attaining different levels of schooling. The net effect of these is 
approximately a 1.8 year reduction in predicted years of schooling. 
To investigate the robustness of our results to endogenous education formation, we 
use the point estimates described to adjust schooling levels. Unfortunately the 
ENADID only allows identification of migrant parents for individuals still living with 
their parents, preventing us knowing whether many individuals in their late twenties, 
thirties and forties had migrant parents. Therefore to make an extreme assumption to 
examine the sensitivity of our results, we will assume that all migrants had migrant 
parents, and no non-migrants had migrant parents. We will then adjust upwards the   23
schooling of all migrants with less than 12 years of education by either 1.3 years 
(2SLS) or 1.8 years (COP) and then reestimate the instrumented version of equation 
(7).  
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 present the new coefficient estimates using the 2SLS 
adjustment, and columns 7 and 8 using the COP adjustment. Doing this adjustment 
does not change the sign or significance of any of the variables in our model, but does 
lead to sizeable changes in magnitudes of the coefficients. In particular, the 
interaction between years of education and community migration prevalence becomes 
larger in absolute value, showing a stronger negative interaction effect. Figure 4 plots 
the predicted probability of migration against education years, comparing the 
unadjusted predictions from column 2 of Table 4 to the adjusted predictions in 
column 6. The shape of selection changes towards more positive selection in low and 
medium-network communities. Intuitively, those who migrate would have had more 
education in the absence of the prospect of migration or the migration of their parents. 
However, the pattern is still strongly one of negative selection in high network 
communities. The unadjusted results showed migration to peak at very low levels of 
education, so adjusting upwards these low levels results in a peak at 2 to 5 years, still 
a very low level. Thus while adjusting for endogenous education formation increases 
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7. Conclusion 
We find that in communities with small migration networks, the probability of 
migration is increasing in education up to reasonably high levels of schooling, 
resulting in positive selection of migrants. This is consistent with high costs of 
migration being the determining factor of who migrates in these communities. In 
contrast, in communities with large networks, where migration costs are lower, we 
find migration propensities to be decreasing in education, consistent with lower 
returns to schooling in the U.S. than in Mexico. These results are found to be robust to 
accounting for the undercount of some migrants in Mexican data, and for the 
possibility of endogenous formation of education with respect to migration. 
 
Our results help in part to reconcile conflicting accounts of the direction of education-
selection amongst migrants from Mexico found in the existing literature. Since the 
direction of selectivity depends on the level of migration prevalence in a community, 
studies which estimate the average direction of selection will give different estimates 
if they draw on surveys from communities with differing levels of networks, coupled 
with differences in the extent to which they account for undercounting of more 
educated migrants who move with their entire families.  
 
The results of this paper also suggest that as migration networks continue to develop, 
we should expect to see more negative educational selection of migrants from 
Mexico, due to the low returns to education in illegal jobs in the U.S. In contrast, if 
proposals to allow more legal immigration of unskilled workers are enacted, the 
higher returns to education should result in greater degrees of positive selectivity.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
To prove (a), note first that  L s  and  U s  are solutions of the following equation: 
n n s e n s n s
2 1 ) (
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The marginal effect of an increase in network size on the two critical schooling 
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Figure 1: Migration networks and self-selection patterns  
 
 
Figure 2: Probability of First-time Migration in 1996-97  
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Predicted probabilities obtained from OLS and 2SLS regressions in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3, for 






th percentiles of the community migration prevalence distribution.  
 
s  
L s   U s  
0 μ  
s 0 0 δ μ +  
s e s A
1
1 1
γ μπ δ μ
− − + =  
n s e s B
2 1
1 1
γ γ μπ δ μ
− − − + =  
w ln  
'
L s  
'
U s  





− −    29
 
Figure 3: Probability of Migrating, adjusting for undercounting  
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Predicted probabilities obtained from columns 2 and 4 of Table 3,for males in communities with 
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Figure 4: Probability of Migrating, adjusting for   
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 Table 1: Marital Status of Recent Mexican Immigrants in the U.S. Census
Males Females
Married, with spouse present 14.4 48.3




Never married/Single 55.2 36.1
Source: US Census 5% public use sample (Ruggles et al, 2004)
Immigrants born in Mexico who migrated to the U.S. in last two years
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Number of
Individual level variables Observations Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev.
   ALL COMMUNITIES
Proportion migrating in the last two years 55848 0.0099 1
Age 55848 28.6 9.7 28.4 7.9
Years of Education 55848 8.7 4.4 7.0 3.6
Proportion married 55848 0.55 0.75
Proportion who are household heads 55848 0.50 0.65
Years of Education*Community migration prevalence 55848 1.26 1.3 1.90 1.4
   COMMUNITIES WITH 100,000 OR LESS POPULATION
Proportion migrating in the last two years 25531 0.014
Age 25531 28.2 9.8 28.0 8.0
Years of Education 25531 7.3 4.1 6.3 3.2
Proportion married 25531 0.55 0.74
Proportion who are household heads 25531 0.49 0.67
Years of Education*Community migration prevalence 25531 1.31 1.55 2.21 1.55
Community level variables Number of > median prevalence
(communities with 100,000 or less population) Communities Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev.
Community migration prevalence 254 0.205 0.191 0.355 0.155
State migration rate in 1924 254 0.0068 0.0083 0.010 0.008
Percent of rural households owning land in 1910 254 2.89 2.17 3.41 2.29
Number of schools per 1000 population in 1930 254 1.22 0.43 1.14 0.36
Male school attendance in 1930 (% of 6 to 10 year olds) 254 44.64 11.60 44.61 11.23
Gini of schooling years for males 15-20 in 1960 254 0.51 0.10 0.51 0.10
Average years of schooling of males in 1960 254 2.92 0.81 3.01 0.83
Gini of household income in 1960 254 0.76 0.09 0.75 0.08
Source: 15-49 year old males in ENADID 1997, non-migrants and those migrating in last 2 years for the first time only.
%
All males 15-49 Migrants
All communitiesTable 3: Determinants of First-time Migration for Male 15-49 year olds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Years of Education 0.0672** 0.0548* 0.1485*** 0.1801*** 0.0800* 0.1936*** 0.1969*** 0.0782* 0.2012***
(0.0327) (0.0315) (0.0477) (0.0557) (0.0442) (0.0564) (0.0633) (0.0441) (0.0559)
Years of Education Squared -0.0037** -0.0036** -0.0105*** -0.0132*** -0.0040** -0.0106*** -0.0132*** -0.0042** -0.0117***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0017) (0.0026)
Community Migration Network 10.1308*** 10.0671*** 9.8967*** 9.3965*** 11.4788*** 11.0387*** 9.5639***
(1.0325) (1.0770) (1.1400) (1.1865) (2.2570) (1.9387) (1.9690)
Education*Network -0.4120*** -0.3510*** -0.3082** -0.2453* -0.4637** -0.5521** -0.3441 -0.4669** -0.4318**
(0.1022) (0.1105) (0.1240) (0.1343) (0.2185) (0.2248) (0.2445) (0.1906) (0.2120)
Age 0.1714*** 0.1716*** 0.1994*** 0.2282*** 0.1739*** 0.1944*** 0.2243*** 0.1771*** 0.2027***
(0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0561) (0.0692) (0.0328) (0.0560) (0.0696) (0.0272) (0.0494)
Age Squared -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0042*** -0.0047*** -0.0034*** -0.0041*** -0.0047*** -0.0035*** -0.0043***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0008)
Married dummy 0.8508*** 0.8571*** 0.9057*** 1.0039*** 0.8526*** 0.9058*** 1.0015*** 0.8709*** 0.9184***
(0.1645) (0.1639) (0.2799) (0.3279) (0.1650) (0.2786) (0.3257) (0.1418) (0.2348)
Head of household dummy 0.3493** 0.3466** 1.0114*** 1.0580*** 0.3502** 1.0213*** 1.0624*** 0.3265** 1.0424***
(0.1673) (0.1668) (0.2608) (0.3147) (0.1669) (0.2612) (0.3134) (0.1498) (0.2525)
Population 100,000 +  -0.2981** 0.0855 -0.2442
(0.1450) (0.1355) (0.1670)
Population 20,000-99,999 -0.2756* -0.3790* -0.2713
(0.1637) (0.2037) (0.1661)
Population 15,000-19,999 -0.1106 -0.1904 -0.1737
(0.3081) (0.3045) (0.3119)
Proportion of rural households owning land in 1910 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Male school attendance rate in 1930 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Gini of household income 1960 -0.0007 0.0028 0.0047 0.0066 -0.0024 0.0041 0.0075
(0.0050) (0.0056) (0.0077) (0.0099) (0.0057) (0.0078) (0.0107)
Schools per 1000 in 1930 -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0018 0.0011 0.0003 0.0014 0.0009
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0032)
Gini of Male schooling in 1960 0.0125 0.0081 0.0286 0.0352 0.0138 0.0309 0.0365
(0.0134) (0.0129) (0.0204) (0.0279) (0.0138) (0.0199) (0.0275)
Average Male years of schooling 1960 0.0013 0.0012 0.0034 0.0042 0.0014 0.0036 0.0045
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0032)
Population 100,000+ * Network -2.8767**
(1.3228)
Population 20,000-99,999 * Network 0.5835
(1.5875)
Population 15,000-19,999 * Network 0.2056
(2.0647)
Constant -0.0346** -0.0345** -0.0598*** -0.0723** -0.0373*** -0.0625*** -0.0739**
(0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0216) (0.0288) (0.0136) (0.0210) (0.0287)
Population range covered All All <100K <15K All <100K <15K All <100K
First-stage F-statistics:
    Community Migration Network 34.69 54.14 59.32
    Network * Years of Education 34.93 40.51 56.79 3084.73 2183.4
Municipality Fixed Effects no no no no no no no yes yes
Observations 55848 55848 25531 18097 55848 25531 18097 55848 25531
Number of Communities 288 288 254 228 288 254 228 288 254
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses with standard errors clustered at the municipality (community) level (columns 1 to 7)
Columns 8 and 9 include municipality fixed effects, and use White-corrected standard errors.
All coefficients apart from the constant are multiplied by 100 for display purposes
Instruments used are 1924 state migration rate, and its interaction with years of education.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.Table 4: Robustness to Undercounting and Endogenous Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Years of Education 0.0800* 0.1936*** 0.0793 0.2076*** 0.5175*** 0.6735*** 0.6354*** 0.7936***
(0.0442) (0.0564) (0.0520) (0.0652) (0.0775) (0.0939) (0.0929) (0.1096)
Years of Education Squared -0.0040** -0.0106*** -0.0036* -0.0108*** -0.0164*** -0.0232*** -0.0191*** -0.0251***
(0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0025) (0.0036)
Community Migration Network 11.4788*** 11.0387*** 12.7339*** 12.2867*** 18.9076*** 17.3689*** 21.3500*** 19.4326***
(2.2570) (1.9387) (2.5931) (2.1293) (2.9422) (2.3138) (3.3127) (2.5343)
Education*Network -0.4637** -0.5521** -0.5076** -0.6203** -1.3764*** -1.4589*** -1.6772*** -1.7545***
(0.2185) (0.2248) (0.2568) (0.2487) (0.2890) (0.2945) (0.3374) (0.3337)
Age 0.1739*** 0.1944*** 0.1923*** 0.2133*** 0.1579*** 0.1654*** 0.1507*** 0.1532***
(0.0328) (0.0560) (0.0365) (0.0627) (0.0321) (0.0551) (0.0319) (0.0549)
Age Squared -0.0034*** -0.0041*** -0.0038*** -0.0046*** -0.0030*** -0.0034*** -0.0028*** -0.0032***
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Married dummy 0.8526*** 0.9058*** 0.9518*** 0.9911*** 0.8868*** 0.9368*** 0.9040*** 0.9556***
(0.1650) (0.2786) (0.1862) (0.3060) (0.1657) (0.2797) (0.1664) (0.2809)
Head of household dummy 0.3502** 1.0213*** 0.3854** 1.1707*** 0.3600** 1.0698*** 0.3617** 1.0839***
(0.1669) (0.2612) (0.1859) (0.2882) (0.1678) (0.2634) (0.1682) (0.2648)
Population range: All <100K All <100K All <100K All <100K
First-stage F-statistics:
    Community Migration Network 34.69 54.14 34.72 54.19 34.69 54.14 34.92 55.07
    Network * Years of Education 34.93 40.51 34.98 40.59 34.93 40.51 35.07 41.06
Observations 55848 25531 55848 25531 55848 25531 55848 25531
Number of Communities 288 254 288 254 288 254 288 254
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses with standard errors clustered at the municipality (community) level
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for display purposes
All regressions also include a constant and the state-level controls included in Table 3
Instruments used are 1924 state migration rate, and its interaction with years of education.
Columns 5 though 8 adjust education using 2SLS and Censored Ordered Probit (COP) estimates of the impact of migration
of parents on individual education levels, assuming all migrants have migrant parents and no migrants do (see text).
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Adjusting for Endogenous Education
2SLS adjustment COP adjustment
Unadjusted Adjusting for
as per Table 3 UndercountingTable A1: First-stage results 




1924 state migration rate 0.1656*** 0.3447***
(0.0160) (0.1060)
1924 state migration rate * years of education -0.0035** 0.0834***
(0.0015) (0.0258)
Regression controls
Years of Education -0.0011 0.1304***
(0.0016) (0.0248)




Age Squared 0.0001*** 0.0004***
(0.0000) (0.0001)
Married dummy -0.0037 -0.0352
(0.0039) (0.0317)
Head of household dummy -0.0033 -0.0018
(0.0047) (0.0381)
Proportion of rural households owning land in 1910 0.0001** 0.0009***
(0.0000) (0.0003)
Male school attendance rate in 1930 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0001)
Gini of household income 1960 -0.0001 -0.0033
(0.0009) (0.0069)
Schools per 1000 in 1930 0.0007** 0.0050**
(0.0003) (0.0022)
Gini of Male schooling in 1960 0.0101*** 0.0781***
(0.0025) (0.0201)






Shea Partial R-squared 0.27 0.24
F-statistic on instruments 54.14 40.51
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses with standard errors clustered at the municipality (community) level
All coefficients apart from the constant are multiplied by 100 for display purposes
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.